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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- -- - - - ----------- -------------------------
.·Ji<.S. HERMAN FOSTER and JOHN 
E!-"1 natural parents of 
Jeftrey Adrian Ewing, aka 
Jeffrey Ewing Foster, Deceased, 
a minor, and DAVID MAC KELLY, 
elaintiffs-Respondents, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corpor-: 
ale and politic of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
-----------------
No. 1 90 51 
BRIEF Of RESPONDENTS-CROSS APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in contract based upon a Certificate 
.f S0Jt-lnsurance, and plaintiffs' claim of recovery in this case 
• •c·l upcJ11 the theory that a policy of self-insurance must 
1 J'', 1 insurance coverage for permissive users of 
'" '""' Stato of Utan, and that Salt Lake County is the 
insllrance carrier for David Mac Kelly. 
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DISPOSITIOI" IL" THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court held that the defendant was indebt'c 
plaintiffs in the amount of $15,000 plus costs, attorney's r-
and accrued interest on $150,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment entered by 
t.rial court. Cross Appellant seeks modification of the Judg,. 
insofar as it limits the financial responsibility of Salt; 
County to the sum of $15,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about July 26, 1978, Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, 
Jeffrey Ewing Foster, the deceased son of Mrs. Herman Foster 
i>Jr. John Ewinq, was killed as a result of a motor vehicle/pe'. 
trian accident which occurred at approximately 3900 South an/ 
East in Salt Lake Count/, Utah. That accident involved dece' 
and an emplovee 'Jf .Oa l 1 Lak<> David :'lac Kelly. Mr. l_ 
was employ<ed as a clccput·1 st1icc1[f and ""as at the time oi 
accident, '1r1vin1 ,"j m()t_1"Jr vehicle by 
''" 1, i ssuecl to Kelly incident to his employment as a deputy 
sr.er iff ancl furnished to him on a 24-hour per day, 7-day per week 
bas is. David Mac Kelly, while operating the sheriff's motor 
·oehicle, at approximately the intersection of 3900 South and 900 
East, at about 1 1: 0 0 o'clock in the evening, struck Jeffrey 
Adrian Ewing and killed the young boy. 
On or about March 9, 1978, Kelly was served as a de-
tendant in an action brought by Mrs. Herman Foster and Mr. John 
Ewing for the wrongful death of their son. Kelly contacted 
Farmers Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as "Farmers"), 
the insurance carrier on his personal vehicle which had not been 
involved in the accident, and on or about March 15, 1978, Farmers 
sent a letter demandinq that the County defend Mr. Kelly as self-
insurer of the County motor vehicle involved in the accident. 
('L pg. 39). 
In a letter dated March 23, 1978, the Salt Lake County 
Attorne·;'.o Office refused to defend or otherwise become respon-
" ihl"" for ,'\r. Kelly in the oending action and declined the de-
t0nGc had been tendered. (R. pg. 93) On July 27, 1978, W. 
i\t rit. ,, 1 1 ,'•ix, act ino as independent counsel for David Mac Kelly, 
the defense to Salt Lake County, but no response 
t H'r ['Jed tO that tender. (R. pg. 40) 
-3-
Salt Lcike Countv denied that it had an auto'"'' 
liability policy co•;ering David Mac Kelly and refused to de• 
him in the civil action or to pay any judgment rendered aga 
him therein, and rarmers was forced to represent David Mac Kc. 
under a reservation of rights asserting that Salt Lake Count" 
a self-insurer had a primary duty to defend Mr. Kelly. 
Prior to July 1, 1977, Salt Lake County's motor ve: .. 
les had been insured by commercial insurance companies, the er 
recent of which was the Gulf Insurance Company (hereinaf· 
referred to as "Gulf"), which had provided Salt Lake County w1 
ooth no-fault insurance coverage and 
liability insurance coverage. ( R. pg. 
com pr ehens ive automoc. 
117) The no-fault lie 
of liability were dictated by statute and the limits of liabil 
of the Gulf comprehensive policy were $100,000.00 per person 
$300,000.00 per occurrence for bodily injury and $50,000.00 · 
each occurrence for property damage. 
On or about July 1 3, 1977, the Salt Lake County Com· 
sion voted to investigate a self-insurance program. (Plaint!' 
Exhibit No. 7) On June 27, 1977, Salt Lake County applied ts 
Insurance Commissioner for a Certificate of Self-Insurance 
approved an c:innual lev·; 0f auor0x111ately $500,000.00 to or 0 
security tG pay •)utstand1nci J'Id'Jment debts. (R. pg. 138) 
Salt Lake Count; rel U'd .. n its riowers under Utah Code l\nnot• 
"(_:-(' r I r)n 17-15-13 ( 1953) to levy an unlimited assessment to pay 
j 11 J iudqment 
i tv by 
,·rnnual levy 
incurred. 
obtaining 
and/or an 
Salt Lake County intended to provide 
money from the general public through an 
unlimited assessment for the purpose of 
nav1na outstandinq judgments. 
Un or about June 30, 1977, the Salt Lake County Commis-
sion decided to reject Gulf's bid to provide commercial insurance 
Eor a premium in the sum of $475,000.00, which resulted in fur-
ther savings for the County and the Insurance Commissioner ap-
proved Salt Lake County's application for a Certificate of Insur-
ance. The Certificate of Insurance was issued on July 7, 1977, 
(R. pg. 137; Exhibit No. 3) and the commercial insurance was 
discontinued with Salt Lake County relying on funds obtained from 
the general public for the purpose of paying any judgments 
rendered ag ai ns t it which would otherwise have been paid by 
cornorehensive automobile liability insurance coverage. 
David Mac Kelly thus found himself in the position of 
defendant in a criminal action prosecuted by the County of Salt 
Lai<e as well as defendant in a civil action for wrongful death, 
nrci·•11-,r1 tor damages in the amount of $1,250,000.00. The nature 
the circumstances of the father, John Ewing, and 
'"'·' ,,.r, :"irs. Herman roster, including their medical problems, 
''"'"I c'nncern on the part of Kelly that a trial to a jury "r 
-5-
would have deep emotional impact and probably result in a .. 
plaintiff's verdict. 
Salt Lake County had declined to defend Kelly 
lawsuit or to pay any judgments that might be rendered agai· 
him and in an effort to pursue al 1 reasonable means of avoic. 
personal liability, on or about December 12, 1978, Kelly ente 
into an agreement with Mrs. Herman Foster and John Ewing, pare· 
and natural guardians of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, wherein the par 
ies agreed that the plaintiffs would schedule a non-jury tr 
and that David Mac Kelly would submit without futher contest c 
issue of negligence and liability upon the depositions 
the case and upon the testimony of any other witnesses called 
the plaintiffs. 
It was determined that if the Court found liab1i 
against Kelly for negligence, the amount of damages would 
determined by the Court upon acldi tional proof to be offered 
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs agreed under certain circ 
stances, not to proceed against any of the personal assee 
r\elly other r:han the rights which Kelly had against Salt L 
County or any other insurprs affoniing liability coverage. 
pg. 12) (T 78-1377 - p.4. Exh. l"o. 14) At all times mate' 
herein, Salt LakP County vias rc;pre,,ented by counsel, who nnt 
-f,-
·:ul1intarily withdrew from the case, but refused to defend or 
assist David Mac Kelly. 
On January 4, 1979, by order of the Court and with 
1'onsent of all parties, Salt Lake County, Delmar L. Larsen and 
Rex Vance were voluntarily dismissed from the wrongful death 
action. On July 5, 1979, the wrongful death action by plaintiffs 
against Kelly was tried before the Honorable Judge David K. 
·,vinder. The Judge was fully advised about, and given copies of 
the Stiµulation for Dismissal Without Prejudice as to defendants 
Larsen, Vance and Salt Lake County, and the stipulation entered 
into between the plaintiffs and Kelly. 
The depositions of Utah Highway Patrolman, D. N. 
Tinning, independent witness, Dale V. Leany, defendant Kelly, 
Sheriff Larsen, and Sheriff Vance, were published and considered 
hv the Court in determining the issue of liability. In all the 
depositions referred to above, with the exception of the deposi-
t inn of Highway Patrolman Tinning, counsel for Kelly appeared and 
act i'1elv cross-examined the witnesses. Various counsel for Mr. 
r;,cll/ were properly notified and advised of the deposition of 
P•trnlman Tinning but failed to appear. Documentary evidence was 
,t r<Jd w<cd and considered by the Court; Frank E. Stewart, a 
"1 1 accountant and financial consultant, Mrs. Herman Foster 
J1ihn t::wi ng, each personally testified at the trial· 
-7-
Judge Da,1id K. V.:inder ruled that Mr. Kelly, 
operating the motor vehicle assigned to him and owned b·i 
Lake County, was negligent and his negligence caused an aut 
bile/pedestrian accident which resulted in the death of Jef'· 
Adrian Ewing. A judgment was awarded against Kelly in the so:; 
$150,000.00. 
On January 30, 1979, the plaintiffs filed an act 
against Salt Lake County, claiming that Salt Lake County was: 
automobile liability insurer for Kelly and, as such, was indet·. 
to the plaintiffs in the sum of $100,000.00, and for such ot· 
and further relief as the Court deemed proper. 
Thereafter the matter was heard by the Honorable J1. 
James S. Sawaya on a Mot ion for Summary Judgment, which Mo'. 
for Summary Judgment was granted 
plaintiffs and against defendant. 
by Judge Sawaya in favor 
The judgment was appealec 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and returned to the D 
trict Court for trial. The trial was held on September 13, I" 
before the Honorable David B. Dee, District Judge, withou'. 
jury. 
At trial, olaintiffs contended that the County ape' 
for and received a Certificate 0f Self-Insurance from the 
Insurance Commissioner wh1cn Certificate of Self-Insurance 
-H-
lull f0r-ce and effect at the time of the auto/pedestrian colli-
that no written contract defining the terms of the self-
1nsurance and no written intra-county communication defining the 
terms or limits of coverage had been prepared at any time prior 
to the auto/pedestrian collision; that under the terms of the 
prior commercial insurance contract and the standard terms of 
automobile liability insurance contracts, (Exhibit No. 4) liabil-
1 ty coverage was extended to persons using County vehicles with 
the permission of the County. Plaintiffs also contended that at 
the time of the collision, under the facts of this case, David 
Mac Kelly was a permissive user of the County sheriff's vehicle 
in accordance with the standard insurance definition (Exhibit No. 
4) and was, therefore, an insured under and covered by the Salt 
Lake County Self-Insurance Plan, just as if he had been an insur-
ed under a commercial insurance contract; that the absence of a 
restriction of or limit of indemnity coverage should be construed 
to mean full indemnification of an insured to the extent of his 
liability, which in this case is determined by a judgment against 
!lac Kelly in the sum of $150,000.00, plus costs and inter-
l:n date; and that whether or not Kelly was within the course 
··c•ipe of his ernr:iloyment with Salt Lake County at the time of 
3,1tc)/pedestrian fatal collision, is irrelevant to a deter-
,., 1 ,,.," ,,f the County's liability herein, but that in any event, 
-9-
Kelly was acting 'within t!1e c0urse and scope of his ernpl'J 
with Salt Lake County at the time of said collision. 
Judge Dee ruled (1) that Salt Lake County was a 5, 
insurer, ( 2) that Deputy Sheri ff David Mac Kelly was a permis, 
user and an insured of Salt Lake County, (3) that Salt: 
County was obligated to pro,;ide indemnification to the extent 
$15,000.00 pursuant to the Financial Responsibility Act, and 
that, accordingly, Salt Lake County was obligated to Respond" 
herein for indemnity in the sum of $15,000.00, for attornc 
fees and costs, and for interest on $150,000.00, plus cos·. 
until the payment of the indemnity limit of $1 5,000.00 is madE, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED 
THE APPELLANT'S FINANCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO THE SUM OF $15,000.00. 
A. The henef its of the No-Fault Act and the minimum ics 
ance coverage of the Safety Responsibility Act do 
limit liability. 
The trial court based its decision limiting Appellar 
financial responsibility upon Allstate v. United States Fide: 
& Guaranty, 619 P.2d 329 (Utah, 1980). In Allstate, this :· 
found that the c<Jo-Fault Ac:r., IJ, ·.A. §11-41-1, .::.!:._seq. as amc•,,· 
-1 IJ· 
, ""'".l"'rated the security provisions of the Safety Responsibility 
,',ct, 11.C.A. §41-12-1, et seq., (as amended) and that all insur-
;;nc0 policies should be written to cover both provisions. Having 
fnund Appellant to be a self-insurer, the trial court interpreted 
ill lstate to require that the minimum provided for in the Utah 
Financial Responsibility Act for bodily injury was also the limit 
0f financial responsibility for Appellant. 
Appellant contends that it is liable only for the 
payments described under U.C.A. §31-41-6, as amended, which are 
$1,000 funeral benefit and $2,000 survivor benefit. Appellant 
has made those payments to Respondents. The purpose of the no-
fault statute is to allow for primary benefits to be paid by the 
insurer of a vehicle or by the owner of a vehicle. While not 
including all manner of loss, the no-fault statute recognizes 
certain losses and seeks to compensate for them. (See Belcher v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 409 Mich. 231, 293 N.W. 2d 594 
I 1980)). 
In Pascente v. Stoyle, 456 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (1982) the 
Court defined the purpose of the New York no-fault law as a means 
ro pr,,vicle for "immediate compensation so as to save accident 
'llCl irnc; from becoming destitute as a result of lost earnings or 
expPnses." It was not the purpose of the act to take 
-11-
away the common law right of an injured party. 
court quoted a prior New York decision in it's reasoning: 
"The statute should be employed as a 
sword to gain immediate benefits for 
the injured not as a shield to mini-
mize the insurer's potential dam-
ages." Yan is v. Texaco, 85 Misc. 2d 
94, 97, 378 NYS 2d 570 (1975). 
The Utah Code provides a cause of action for an lnJ'-' 
resulting in death (U.C.A. §31-41-9). While this cause of act: 
may be within the scope of tort law, it is clear that the leG1 
lature did not intend to limit the liability of an insurer to:. 
m1n1mum benefit provided for by the law. 
The lower court correctly applied the principles 
forth in Allstate insofar as U.C.A. §31-41-5(a) requires that 
insurance policy used for security to register and operate 
vehicle must include the minimum coverage provisions of 
Safety Responsibility Act. The alternative to providing 
insurance policy under U.C.A. §31-41-5(a) is to provide eac. 
alent security under IJ.C.A. §31-41-S(b). Appellant obtained· 
self-insurance certificate under the equivalent security pr,; 
sion of U.C.A. §31-41-SlbJ. 
- 1 2.-
-
Appellant contends it is exempt from the provisions of 
Har. Safety Responsibility Act by virtue of U.C.A. §41-12-
3 J. The Utah Safety Responsibility Act prescribes the process of 
Pstablishinq proof of financial responsibility by insurance or 
rJ'Jnd. (Western Casualty Surety Co. v. Transamerica Insurance 
Co., 26 Ut.2d SO, 484 P.2d 1180 (1971)). Governmental entities 
are exempted from the Act because they are considered solvent and 
furtner, because they are an available source of indemnifica-
tion. The exemption afforded to appellant under U.C.A. §41-12-33 
exempts it only from having to prove a minimum level of financial 
responsibility in the event of an accident. However, as a self-
insurer, Appellant must provide a security equivalent required by 
U.C.A. §31-41-S(a) equal to the minimum amount of coverage re-
cJuired in an insurance policy to quality as security under the 
No-Fault Act. 
Neither the Utah No-Fault Act or the Utah Safety Re-
sponsibility Act seek to limit the amount of recovery by one who 
•,as been in-jured or to limit the amount of liability of an insur-
e·l. The Acts merely provide a method of immediately securing 
1Jci·1m.,nt f<Jr immediate (but not total) losses and provide for the 
JI!'., c,, post a security for those who own and/or operate a 
"1'. \., witnout the security ceguired. (See Compensation Systems 
1 :,,,'.:; ;Jo-Fault statute, Robert E. Keeton, Utah L.R. 1973: 
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383; Ceilings, Costs and Compulsion In Auto Compensation Le". 
tion, Walter J. Blum and Harcy Kalven, Jr., Utah L.R. 1973: 
B. A self-insur:er has the obligations and duties v, 
insurer under U.C.A. S31-41-5(b). 
1. Factual Background. 
Prior to self-insuring, Aopellant had liability in 
ance coverage through a commercial carrier (Exhibit No. 6) 
policy limits of $100,000.00 per per:son for bodily inju 
caused by any permissive user of Appellant's vehicles. Su 
guently, Appellant applied for and received a certificat1 
self-insurance. In its letter of application to the State In 
ance Commission :Exhibit No. 17), Appellant stated its inten 
to provide security "equivalent" to that for which Appellant 
been paying a commercial carrier. Appellant did not set f, 
any limits of its liability in its application for self-in 
ance. Accordingly, by its actions of allocating a r:eserve 
possible judgments in an amount actually greater: than the an 
commercial or·emium for a $100,000 per person liability pol 
and reserving the authority to further assess taxpayers as ne 
sary to satisf·; other iudqmPnts, Acipcl lant createrl the leq1t 1 
and r"asonable public: expeet.3ti•'n 1.hctt it would p3'1 judgmen' 
the extent of ;it leac.t- 11)11, ,liJIJ. 1111. 
Definition of self-insurer. 
A self-insurer substitutes for an insurance policy the 
assurance that judgments aqainst it will be paid. A self-insurer 
under the no-fault act who offers to provide indemnity equivalent 
t(1 that formerly provided by a commercial carrier, must pay 
legitimate claims to the same extent as would have been paid by 
tl1e commercial carrier. 
Appellant cites several cases in suppert of its argu-
ment that due to the absence of an insurance contract, any stat-
utes which regard contracts and indemnification by insurers do 
not apply to or bind Appellant. 
In Southern Home Insurance Co. v. Burdette' s Leasing, 
234 s.w. 2d 870, (S.C., 1977), the Court states that (1) a self-
i ns urer substitutes for an insurance policy to the extent of the 
statutory policy requirements; (2) Burdette, the self-insurer, 
the operation of its motor vehicles by persons using 
them with permission, expressed or implied; and (3) a self-insur-
er should provide the same protection to the public that a statu-
1_,)r·1 liability policy provides since the purpose of public lia-
insurance is to protect innocent victims of motor vehicle 
(Citing Evans v. American Home Insurance, 252 S.C. 
'"' :i.E:. 2d 811 I 1969) ). 
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Appellant rPl ies on Glen Falls Insurance Co. v. 
idated Freiqhtwavs, Cal.R. 789 (1966) for the propositi<Jn 
a self-insurer is not an ins11rance carrier and is not obliJ: 
under any rules of extended oolicy situations such as oer.nisc 
users. Contrar-y to Appellant's interpretation, the Cour· 
holding actually supports Respondent's theory that the law r. 
be liberally construed in order- to qive monetary pr-otection 
persons who are injured on the highway through the negligence 
others. (See also Continental Casualty Company v. Phoenix C: 
struction Company, 296 P.2d 801 (Cal., 1956)). In Guercio 
Hertz, 358 N.E:. 2d 261 (New York, 19611, the Court found t· 
self-insurance only relieved the self-insurer of the obliga'.. 
to provide a specific policy for liability insurance. 
Another case l\opellant cites in suppor-t of its exter.:· 
use theory is Western Pioneer Insurance v. Estate of Tai:. 
(September 29, 1982, Cl\ Fifth App. Dist., California). The 
was brought under- the California Wrongful Death Statute b\ 
insur-ance company of a oassenqer in a state owned vehicle whc 
killed while nding in the vehicle in the course of his empl 
ment. 
i ng. 
He and his --:lri1er, who wac, also killed had been Jr;-
The widow of the pas'.3engcer rPcover-ed from her husba· 
life insurance comr-,any, r,\'o:t-f-:.r11 P1onef?r. ?1c)nPF:r · 
filed a declarator'/ rroli<-'t act:1on .1r1a1nst the Estate of,. 
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-Ji i-1cer) and asked for indemnification of California's self-
l r"j _-., IJrance • The California court overt urned the lower court's 
dPci-c;1nn for western Pioneer using the reasoning in Metro u.s. 
:3erv1ces, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 96 C.A. 3d 678, 158 Cal. 
!1. 207 (1979). The Metro case was decided on the principal that 
the Cit-; as a self-insurer was not within the purview of the 
statute designed to settle disputes between insurance carriers 
regarding primary or secondary liability. Since Western Pioneer 
is an unreported case, respondent must assume that the Court in 
Western Pioneer used this logic in overturning Western Pioneer's 
attempt to have the State indemnify them because the Court could 
nt)t settle disputes between primary and secondary insurance 
carriers. 
The present case is distinguishable in that Respondent 
ts seeking relief directly from the self-insurer who is the owner 
,,f the vehicle, the primary insurer, and there is no other col-
lectible insurance. 
J. The limit of Appellant's liability as a self-insurer is 
undefined. 
un0 of the obligations of an insurer is to define the 
cl'_ -it 'its liability coverage. If there is no limitation or 
: , ,; furth, the limit of liability is presumed to be the 
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extent of the loss. (:L pg. 606, 607) Appellant negle>ctH 
set forth limitations of its liability when it determined tha'. 
would adopt a program of self-insurance. (Exhibit 7). 
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix, 296 P.2d 0 
(Cal., 1956), the Court found that the language of a finan;. 
responsibility statute could not be interpreted to limit 
insurer's liability to the stated minimum limits; rather it'·· 
be interpreted as providing full or maximum coverage. Liabil. 
not clearly excluded from coverage is presumed to have b0 • 
included (Topeka Railroad Equipment v. Formost, 5 Kans. App. 
133, 614 P.2d 461, Kan., 1980). 
Appellant set up a fund for self-insurance from le•;, 
and tax assessments. Appellant failed to notify its emplo;·• 
and agents, or the general public, of any reservations or sc, 
ific limits to its liability. Having set up a fund from 
public coffers purportedly to protect its employees and memb· 
of the public from loss, appellant now denies liability cover 
to those "beneficiaries" of the self-insurance program. ;we, 
lant is attempting to save money at the expense of the pers. 
for whose benefit the No-Fault and Safety Responsibility 
were enacted. 
As to Appel lcin'=' s cirCJuments that, because it is a' 
insurer and ther'7 is no pol icy contract to construe, gP' 
-1 >;-
i>t inc1µles of insurance law are inapplicable to them, this Court 
stated in Foster v. Salt Lake County, 632 P.2d 810, at 815 (Utah, 
1981) that: 
"To determine the scope of the [coun-
ty's] self-insurance program, recourse 
must be had to Utah's insurance law 
and . to general legal principles 
relating to liability insurance and 
insurance carriers." 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT IS INADEQUATE ON THE BASIS OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
A. Appellant's self-insurance was equivalent to insurance 
coverage that provided for $100,000.00 for bodily 
injury. 
Deputy Insurance Commissioner, Jeffrey Gabardi, testi-
fied that the State Insurance Commission would not have issued a 
,:ertiflcate to Appellant if Apµellant had not intended to keep 
the same liability coverage it had with their Gulf Insurance 
Puiic; IR. pq. 616). The basic criteria in allowing an entity to 
'Plt-1n3ure is that the entity is financially stable to the point 
i'-""-11nq in the case of claims or judgments against them. 
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Self-Insurers must ,nee<et the same standards with re' 
to furnishing coverage to insureds as do commercial carrier: 
Pg. 5 99). A self-insurer which does not meet those stand: 
would not be certified by the State Insurance Commission 
6 60). "If an entity or a person is going to become self-ins'J'.· 
[the State Insurance Commission wants] them to respond i:, 
same manner as an insurance company." (Mr. Gabardi, R. 
602). The public expects the same protection from a self-ins.· 
as a common carrier. Apoellant did not notify the State Ins 
ance Commission that they intended to provide only the mini· 
basic benefits provided for under the Utah No-Fault Act. If 
had, the State Insurance Commision would not have certif 
Appellant as a self-insurer. (R. pg. 602). 
B. Appellant made no attempt to limit the use oft:' 
vehicle by David Mac Kelly. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the County 
iff' s Department issued a patrol car to David 1'1ac Kelly on J 
day week, 24-hour day basis. The purpose of this was to a!. 
Kelly to have the automobile to serve bench warrants after 
working hours and to ha·;e Kell/ available for emergency dut, 
The deposition of Sheriff Delmcir L. La rs(Jn 
Respondents', Ewing and Post-nr''-i, aqa.inst David :•lac 
0-
s rc;ad into the record of the present case. 
tt, Sheriff Larson testified that he knew of 
(R. pg. 575) In 
Kelly's drinking 
problem for one and one-half years prior to the accident. In 
tnat time, Sheriff Larson knew that Kelly had an accident in his 
•Jwn vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol and had 
been issued a citation by the University of Utah Police for 
driving under the influence. 
With that knowledge, Sheriff Larson, his superiors or 
Appellant did not attempt to restrict the use of their vehicle by 
Kelly except for a general rule that their employees not drive 
the vehicles assigned to them while under the influence. Appel-
lant waived its right to deny coverage because it knew of the 
possible conditions under which its permissive user, Kelly, would 
improperly use the vehicle. "Waiver by an insurer is unilateral 
in that it arises out of either action or non-action of insurer 
or its duly authorized agents and rests upon circumstances indic-
ating or inferring that relinquishment of a right was voluntarily 
int'c'nded by insurer with full knowledge of all facts pertaining 
lher<>to ( auchanan v. Switzerland General Insurance Co., 455 P.2d 
:44, (wash., 1969)). 
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POINT Ill 
APPELLANT IS BOUND BY THE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST KELLY. 
A. Appellant was the indemnitor of David Mac 
Kelly. 
The District Court found Kelly to be a beneficiar, 
the self-insured Appellant and therefore Appellant is lawL 
required to provide indemnity in favor of David Mac Kelly · 
amount of $150,000.00. 
Appellant contends the signed consent judgment agr' 
ment between Ewing and Foster and Kelly released the AppeL 
from their obligation to indemnify as the self-insurer of 
vehicle driven by Kelly, their permissive user. 
A wel I-accepted and general rule is that where 
insurer received a notice of a suit and is allowed an 
to defend but refused to do so, it is bound by the findinas 
judqment, absPnt a showing of collusion or fraud. ( McCartr.: 
Parks, 564 P. 2d 122, (Utah, 1977); East v. Fields, 259 P.2d 0 
(Wash., 1953); Warren P<>troleum Coro. v. J. ·w. Green, 417 
242 (5th Cir., 196lJ). 
The defense or 1Ja'J1'J ."lac Kc,l ly was twice, tender'' 
Appell ant. Bot:1 times ''PP'°llant refii:;Ad to defend Kelly. 
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Kelly, being abandoned by his primary insurer, agreed 
t., cunsent judgment in order to protect his assets with the 
und"O rstand l nq that he would seek indemnification of the judgment 
aya1nst him from Appellant. 
Appellant argues that Kelly incurred no loss, therefore 
he is not entitled to their indemnification. In the case of 
ruchichi v. City of Chicaqo, 49 Ill. App. 320, 199 N.E.2d 652, 
I 1964), Richichi had a j udqment against a police officer in the 
amount of $40,000.00 but he had collected only $1.01. Richichi 
filed suit against the City of Chicago and asked for indemnifica-
t ion. The Court held: 
"If it were held that the city would 
have to pay only such amount of the 
judgment as the policeman could afford 
to pay to the injured party, it would 
create a sequi ty of action and the 
purpose of the [indemnification] 
statute would be defeated." 
Likewise, if Appellant is only to pay as much of the 
]udument as Kelly could afford to pay, it would defeat the pur-
>t the Certificate of Self-Insurance by which Appellant 
1 i c1xnµly with the provions of the Utah No-Fault Act and 
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the Utah Safety Resnonsibility Act, the resoondents woul<:l r,, 
ue to suffer the consequences of the wrongful death of , 
child with no adequate comoensation. 
Appellant chose by failino to expressly state other .. 
to have an unlimited liability under its self-insurance 
and Respondents are entitled to recover the entire judgJ, 
obtained against Kelly from Appellant. 
B. The consent judgment was not collusive. 
Appellant's arguments regarding collusion have no meo 
in light of the fact that the aoreement entered into bet·,, 
Resrx:>ndents Ewing and Foster and 
and acknowledged by the Court. 
rnent, Inc. '!. Welch, 115 Ariz. 
Resoondent Kelly was revt'· 
Appellant cites, Mustang Eq ... 
206, 564 P.2d 895, I 1977' 
support of its definition of a collusive agreement. The Court 
Mustang noted that pre-trial aqreements had been approved 
their jurisdiction and stated that disclosure was necessar, 
uphold the val id i ty of such an agreement. The Court found 
agreement in question •as not collusive and did not encour 
fraud because the agrcee1no c0-·:let"'ncJant maintained a bond· 
adversary posture at ,,n<J tt1e trial was conducted 1' 
would have been without the 
Such is the case with the Foster-Ewing v. David Mac 
trial, (Third District Court, 78-1377). The trial was held 
afld tlw 3qreement accepted by the Court. Counsel for Kelly 
and actively cross-examined the witnesses. Documentary 
e'I 1dence was introduced and considered by the Court and personal 
testimony was qiven. 
Ap pe 11 ant is reg ui red to prove by clear and convincing 
its allegations of collusion, (Universal CIT Credit 
Corp.''· Sohm, 15 Ut.2d 262, 391 P.2d 293 (1964), a burden it has 
failed to meet. 
C. .l\ppellant had an obligation and an opportunity to 
defend Kelly. 
Appellant states that its refusal in defending stems 
frmn Kelly's failure to cooperate in his own defense and that 
Kpl ly was not a permissive user of its vehicle. Substantially 
the same arqument can be made with regard to Appellant's failure 
tu coof,erate with the defense of its insured. David Mac Kelly 
a GPrm1ssive user of Appellant's vehicles with the meaninq of 
I 1 t 1,J t '':'. (IJ.C.A. Permission may be expressed 
1c·i: 1 P•l ind may be established by showing the course of con-
·' t 1unsl11p between parties which signifies acquiescence 
1 1 1 , ) f insured . Alliance Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hartford 
-25-
Accident & Indemnity Co., 210 Kan. 767, 504 P.2d 161 iic· 
Since Kelly was a permissive user of Appellant's vehicle 
time of the accident, Appellant was under the duty to insure, 
as Kelly's employer, but as Kelly's insurer. The liability of 
insurer is absolute upon the happening of a loss and is 
dependent upon a recovery of a 
the making of any payment to 
judgment against the 
the ini ure<'I person. 
insured 
( Couc\ 
Insurance, 2d 45; 24, Liability of Insurer Under Liability cs, 
tracts; Viddish v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 41 
Super., 221, 124 A.2d 607, Metcalf v. Hartford Accident & Indu· 
nit'! Co., 126 N.W.2d 471 (Nebr., 1964), Coblentz v. Amemc 
Surety Company of New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th, 1969), Guercio 
Hertz), supra. 
Appellant 
not defending Kelly. 
failed to protect its potential liability: 
Appellant was given every opportunity 
appear and defend Kelly and failed and refused to do so. 
David Mac Kelly was an employee of Appellant anJ 
permissive uset: of a vehicle owned and operated by Appelk, 
r,ppellant had a duty to :naintain security by insurance or se'.: 
insurance regarding the operation and use of its motor vehicle 
Kelly. Respondents seek to t:eCO'Jec the judgment obtained agd: 
David :-lac ;<elly foe the ,ironqf11l death of theit: child res,iP 
ft:om the opration •if Appellant's vehicle by David Mac Kell!· 
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1 ( of the Indemnification Act, and all arguments made 
r··,iardinq the employer/employee relation of Appellant and Kelly, 
including scooe of employment, are irrelevant in light of the 
fact that Kelly was a permissive user of the automobile and 
P,ppel lant 
liability 
is required 
coverage for 
that Vi>hicle. 
by 
all 
law to provide security, including 
damages resulting from the user of 
Appellant argues that the provisions of the Government-
al Immunity Act are applicable in this case. However, this is 
not a suit against Salt Lake County pursuant to U.C.A. §63-30-7, 
nor is it a suit under the Indemnification of the Public Officers 
and Emoloyees Act, U.C.A. §63-48-1, seq. This suit derives 
from the fact that Salt Lake County is acting as an insurer of a 
·;ehicle and 1 iable as an insurer and not as an employer or gov-
ernmental entity. As an insurer, Appellant has a duty to defend 
Kell; and refused to do so, therefore is bound by the judgment 
aq a inst it. 
-27-
A. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR INTEREST ON 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST KELLY ANO FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
Appellant is self-insurer and 
benefits customarily provided 
similar coveraqe. 
obligated to 
by insurers 
PrC:,1/ 
of feCl· 
Appellant was found by the lower court to be obligat' 
as a self-insurer for the indemnification of David Mac Kelly a· 
was ordered to pay interest on the $150,000.00 judgment aqair1· 
Kelly. Appellant argues that the liability of insurer for inte. 
est on judgments arrives from policy language and since there 
no policy of insurance or contract awarding interest, Appella· 
should not have to pay the interest on the judgment aqa1c 
Kelly. 
As stated above, Appellant's self-insurance cert1fic; 
substitutes for the equivalent commercial pol icy and this Co. 
has held that in order to determine the scope of the Coun'. 
self-insurance program, insurance law principles must be cons; 
ered. 
The lower court awarded interest on jurlqment hasi, 
Respondent's arguments if Appellant puts itself in the 
of an ins ur ,or , h ,o must wa the same course. 
In Peterson v. Western Casualty and Surety Company, 19 
'it._'d 26, 425 P.2d 769 (1967), the burden of paying interest on a 
1ucJ'Jment went to the insurance company because the delay in 
,;a;ment of the judgment is chargeable to the insurance company 
since it controls the litigation. Appellant had numerous oppor-
tun1ties to settle the instant case and to defend itself in the 
urwr action and did not. Appellant is the insurer of its ve-
l11cles and responsible for delaying the settlement of this case, 
therefore Appellant should pay interest upon the :iudgment. (See 
also Security Insurance Company of Hartford v. Houser, 552 P.2d 
308 (Colo., 1976). 
B. Costs and Fees. 
Respondents filed a declaratory action against Appel-
lants as the insurers of the vehicle causing the death of Jeffery 
Arlrian Ewing/Foster. Under U.C.A. §78-33-10 the Court may grant 
ctn award of costs that seem equitable and just. Furthermore, the 
,_011rt in "'estern Casualty and Surety Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 
I 1:1 
'Jtah, 1 980) said that costs could be assessed against the 
that conducted the litigation in bad faith. Appellant has 
t rnhornl'/ litiqious and has twice appealed the judgment 
it. Appellant did not choose to undertake the defense of 
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David i•lac Kellv and pr-otect its own interest, has refused t 
the judgments against it and was justly assessed costs under 
declaratory Judgment action. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is the self-insurer of the vehicle driver.· 
David Mac Kelly. Appellant's self-insurance cel:"tificate, is,,-
undel:" U.C.A. §31-41-S(b) is equivalent to the security that wGc 
be used to confol:"m to the provisions of §31-41-S(a). The secc 
ity used to confol:"m to §31-41-S(a) incorporates the provisions· 
the Safety Responsibility Act, which states that an insura'. 
policy used as secucity under §31-41-S(a) must have cert; 
minimum limits of insurance coverage in ordel:" to satisfy 
proof of financial cesoonsibility provisions in §41-12-1, 
seq. Neither act limits the amount of recovel:"y available to'. 
who has been injured by a motor vehicle. 
Aopellant failed to limit its liability by specifin. 
stating a limit on its application for self-insurance or 
infoLminq its insureds or beneficial:"ies of any limits. Liab!l 
not clearly excluded from covel:"age is presumed to have '.'.· 
included. 
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The State Insurance Commission would not have issued a 
cr-rtlf1cate of self-insurance to Appellant if the Commission had 
known that Appellant did not intend to provide the same level of 
coverage previously provided by its commercial carrier or that 
MP Del lant intended to provide only the immediate loss coverages 
of the No-Fault Act. The State Insurance Commission applies the 
SdlTie standards to self-insurers as they do to commercial insur-
ers. 
Appellant waived its right to deny coverage of its 
permissive user, David Mac Kelly, by virtue of allowing Kelly to 
continue to use a vehicle after Appellant had known for a year 
and a half that Kelly had a drinking problem. 
Appellant was correctly held to be the insurer of David 
1\1ac Kelly and is bound by the judgment against it as well as 
interest upon that judgment and costs and legal fees awarded 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Therefor, the District Court's award to the respondent 
in rhe amount of $15,000.00 based on the minimums provided for in 
r'-,e Safety Resoonsibility Act is in error since the language of 
sets forth the minimum amount of liability coverage 
i tu provide security under the No-Fault Act and does not in 
rti:Jnn<'r restrict or limit the amount recoverable in the event 
:-i , 1 ·ie n t. 
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Furthermore, the Appellant is bound by the judon,, 
against Kelly in the amount of $150,000.00 and is liable for 
interest from date of Judgment as well as costs and attornec 
fees. 
DATED th1s;;;(!day of August, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN,'/· •) 
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